Towards a Theory of the Regulated Fishery by Wilen, James E.
Towards a Theory
of the Regulated Fishery
James E. Wilen
Department of Agricultural Economics
University of California
Davis, California
Abstract This paper develops a model of a modern reg-
ulated fishery in which direct biological controls such as gear
restrictions and shortened seasons are used to control allow-
able harvest. Individual fishermen are assumed to make de-
cisions regarding potential fishing and capacity in light of how
they anticipate fellow fishermen and regulators to act. An equi-
librium occurs in which there is excess capacity that is con-
trolled at the fishery level to ensure aggregate harvest targets
are not exceeded. Some discussion of alternative mechanisms
such as direct limitations or taxes on potential effort and on
individual fishermen is also presented.
A quick scan of the literature in fishery economics reveals that
virtually no attention has been given to developing theories of
microeconomic behavior that realistically capture the nature of
the decision environment modem fishermen are faced with. This
stands in particular contrast to the work being done in other
fields of applied microeconomics, such as utilities regulation the-
ory, where careful attempts have been made to capture the real-
world working environment of industries. These latter studies
have given applied microeconomic theory a degree of legitimacy
in the last few years as several previously misunderstood real-
world policy problems have been resolved with the aid of re-
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aiistic theory and careful empirical research. The research fmd-
ings have often led to better regulation policies as well as new
sets of conceptual problems to look at.
Somewhat surprisingly, such theory-policy feedback has not
taken place in fishery economics, even though it is sorely
needed. In fact, only recently has much attention been paid to
any new conceptual issues in the field. In the meantime, policy
makers have increasingly found themselves struggling to patch
up old and ineffective regulatory schemes or design new ones
without being able to confidently predict the outcome of their
policies. There is clearly a role for economists here, but it calls
for a fairly major shift in emphasis away from normative mod-
eling and towards predictive modeling. This paper discusses a
tentative framework for such modeling that captures some of the
important features of the regulatory structure in place in most
modern fisheries.
Modern Fisheries—Some Stylized Facts
Economists have spent considerable effort on conceptual models
of fisheries since World War II, and some important insights
have been drawn. The most important results are probably those
contrasting the nature of open access fisheries with various for-
mulations of "optimally managed" fisheries. Unfortunately,
however, beyond making the point that open access fisheries are
potentially wasteful and threatening to species survival, we have
not had much impact on real-world fishery management. To be
fair, we have influenced the setting of fishery management goals
in the larger sense, for example in directives under the Fishery
Conservation and Management Act to manage for "socially op-
timal" stock levels rather than maximum sustained yields. In
addition, economists' ideas about tradeable individual catch quo-
tas, fishermen's cooperatives, and other efficiency-enhancing in-
stitutional changes are beginning to be talked about and gingerly
experimented with at this point. On the whole, however, we have
not helped much at the field level of fisheries, where these goals
are (usually imperfectly) translated into specific policy actions.Towards a Theory of the Regulated Fishery 371
This lack of field-level experience has in tum led to some in-
correct understanding of how real-world fisheries actually op-
erate.
Perhaps the most important difference betvi'een real-world
fisheries and economists' (textbook) views of them is that the
pure common-property open access model is no longer relevant.
In the past, when the important world fisheries were high seas
fisheries subject to no controls, it was valid to picture a process
in which entry would occur until a bionomic equilibrium was
reached. Today, however, most important fisheries have come
under the jurisdiction of some nation and all are managed, mainly
through traditional direct controls such as closed seasons and
gear restrictions. They are managed first to ensure species sur-
vival, and second to produce an adequate (short-run) return to
fishermen. The implication is that the view that fisheries will be
driven to some low-level species equilibrium through entry is a
faulty description of reality. In fact, most fisheries are managed
to make sure that the stock does not fall below a certain openly
targeted level (often the point of maximum sustainable yield). It
is reasonable as a working hypothesis to propose, in fact, that
management agencies will create instruments and controls nec-
essary to make sure that targeted stocks (and corresponding al-
lowable harvests) are maintained on average.
Within this context of a relatively fixed stock target, season-
to-season management tasks are anything but simple. In essence,
however, they generally boil down to an adversary situation in
which the industry makes decisions about vessel designs and
pattems of fishing behavior and the regulators use controls at
their disposal to make sure that the application of such fishing
capacity does not cause allowable harvest targets to be ex-
ceeded. In the real world, both species stock levels and the ef-
fectiveness of the application of effort are uncertain in varying
degrees; regulators fine tune by monitoring catch, effort, and the
like and then adjusting controls to achieve the goals. In fisheries
where both species stock size and potential effort are uncertain
and the species is particularly vulnerable, the fine tuning is very
fine (e.g., 15-minute openings ofthe British Columbia herring372 James E. Wilen
fishery). In Pacific Coast salmon, fine tuning takes place week
to week; in other fisheries controls are only adjusted yearly be-
tween seasons.
For the purposes of modeling real fisheries, the above obser-
vations indicate a need to look at the nature of the interaction
between regulators and regulatees. At the aggregate level, reg-
ulators view their primary mandate as controlling the application
of fishing effort by the industry (if necessary) in order to prevent
overfishing, whereas the industry is collectively trying to cir-
cumvent the regulators and surpass the regulatory constraints in
order to increase short-run profits. Industry behavior is not, of
course, a result of carefully planned collective decisions, but is
itself the outcome of gaming situations between the individual
units at the microeconomic level. The mix of all ofthese inter-
actions determines how an industry and regulatory structure will
evolve. In the next section, a simple model ofthese interactions
is developed.
A Model of the Regulated Fishery
Regulator-regulatee interaction may be formalized in a simple
model ofthe fishery as follows. First consider the aggregate pro-
duction function
H = F{X, K) (1)
where X is the species stock size, A" is a measure of aggregate
industry fishing potential, and H is the aggregate harvest. We
will assume that K is single-dimensioned, although in real fish-
eries K is in fact a function of several inputs that are not nec-
essarily efficiently combined. Not much thought has been given
to what form H should take and most studies simply borrow
convenient forms from standard microeconomic theory. We will
not have to be explicit other than to assume that f"(0, K) = i)
= F{X, 0). From Equation (1) above we can define the regulated
production function:
H = F(X, BK) = f{QK) 0 < e < 1 (2)Towards a Theory of the Regulated Fishery 373
For a given exogenous or prechosen species stock size X, a par-
ticular harvest objective H may be achieved by adjusting the
regulation parameter 6 to dampen potential effort K (chosen by
the industry) to a level of "effective effort" 9A;. The parameter
9 captures such things as shortened seasons, area closures, gear
restrictions, and so^on.
By fixing H = H = fidK), the above formulajtiori_implicitly
yields a feedback regulation function 9 = Q(K; H, X) that es-
tablishes the level of 6 that will allow exactly H to be harvested
with potential effort K. Such an instantaneous adjustment policy
represents the extreme in controllability, of course, although sev-
eral regulated fisheries probably are relatively close. In other
fisheries 6 must be set in advance and hence X and K must be
estimated to arrive at a preset 9. Whether or not H is actually
achieved as a result depends on how accurate forecasts of X K,
and / are.
The level of aggregate potential effort that must be monitored
(and perhaps regulated by setting 9 < 1) is determined by the
fishing industry as a whole. The industry is composed of many
individual decision-making units, of course, and hence the sum
of their individual decisions results in the particular level of K.
Let us assume that there are N members of the industry and
each must decide how much potential effort to apply to the fish-
ery. Let ki be the amount chosen by the /th member, r the rental
price of a unit of potential capacity, and P - 1 the price per unit
offish caught. Then the /th vessel owner sees profits -rr to be
n," = ^ fi^^kj) - rki (3)
Z kj
The anticipated profit formulation in Equation (3) reflects the
assumption that each vessel owner realizes the nature of the
interactions between himself or herself, the regulators, and the
other fishermen. The profits are contingent on what the remain-
ing N — 1 fishermen choose as their levels of Ay as well as what
level 9 is chosen by the regulatory authority. Since each views
the problem in a similar way, we have, in effect, a noncooper-
ative N-person game that determines the outcome.James E. Wilen
To solve the problem, let us assume that each vessel owner
makes a forecast of the other fishermen's potential capacity (N
- \)k. Assume also that regulators are able to employ instan-
taneous policy adjustment to fix f{BK) = H. Then the optimal
level of ki for our representative fisherman is found by differ-
entiating Equation (3) and setting it equal to zero:
dih ^ /[A-. + (A^ - 1)^-] - kj _ ^
dki [k, + (N - Dkf ' *'**
Remember that / is fixed and equal to H, and that total antici-
pated potential effort Ikj = A, -h (N - \)k. Thus the optimal
level of ki for our representative fisherman is
The level of ki in Equation (5) is not necessarily an equilibrium
choice, since it depends on k, which may or may not turn out
ex post to be a correct anticipation. We can define an expec-
tations equilibrium (or Nash equilibrium) to be one in which each
individual fisherman forecasts k and chooses kJ, which then
turns out to be the same k predicted by the other fishermen in
their choices. Thus in an expectations equilibrium ki = k. In
the general case, we can rewrite Equation (5) to yield
^J^-N (6)
Thus our representative fisherman will attempt to build a bigger
boat than rival fishermen as long as





FIGURE 1. Efficient and regulated equilibrium levels.
or when the rivals' forecasted revenues per vessel are greater
than costs rA^by the factor M(7V - I). An equilibrium kf = lc,
the expectations or Nash equilibrium, is reached where
(8)
N - \
At that point each vesse^ is still making a positive (but small for
largeN) profit equal to rA/( A' - I) and the industry's total profits
are rk[N/iN - I)]. Figure 1 shows the regulated industry equi-
librium as modeled ^bove. Suppose that regulators desire that
the total harvest be H. The most efficient way to harvest would
be to set e = 1 and allow only N/i units of effort. But from
Equation (7) above, we know that an expectations equilibrium
will not be sustained at that point since ///VA' > rlN/(N - I)].
Thus each vessel owner will apply more effort, and 6 will have
to be set at lower values to keep /(O/VA) ^ //.'An equilibrium
is reached where potential effort has expanded to Nlc and effec-376 James E. Wilen
tive effort actually applied to Nk = 'QNI. At this point, the total
cost of using excess effort to catch H is as shown above.
As the above model suggests, there will be a tendency towards
rent dissipation, the extent of which depends upon how large A'
is. For large N, rent dissipation will be nearly complete with
large efficiency losses where ffr is large.^ Given the tendency
toward inefficiency and dissipation of profits, and given that par-
ticipants should realize this, the question arises of why such
behavior takes place. The answer is fairly simple. By de facto
fixing of the aggregate catch, regulators force individual decision
makers to focus on relative shares of the total rent. But since
the shares sum to one, one unit's share loss is the rest of the
industry's gain and vice versa. Thus each unit must always be
making a strategic decision relative to the rest of the industry.
Unfortunately, however, disequilibrium decisions, which look
strategically best from the point of view of each unit, have the
effect of worsening everyone's position when actually enacted.
This situation is encountered in other group behavior instances
and is basically a variant of the Prisoners' Dilemma problem.
This can be seen by supposing that we begin with all N partic-
ipants selecting an effort level li^ ko < k, that is, a disequilibrium
ko more efficient than the equilibrium k. Now suppose that our
representative fisherman contemplates increasing potential ef-
forts to ko < k* ^ k. Figure 2 shows the pay-off matrix; each
cell shows by how much profits would increase if the rest of the
industry made a similar adjustment or stayed at ko. Although it
is not readily obvious by inspection, it canj)e shown that when-
ever the industry is out of equilibrium (ko < k), the best individual
strategy is to increase effort to k* regardless of which strategy
is anticipated by one's rivals. Thus if one believes that the in-
dustry will maintain a leve! {N - l)A:o <(N - \)k, then the right
column of the matrix yields the relevant payoffs and the top right
box will be strictly positive when ko < k. If it i_s believed that
the industry will adjust to a larger Ao < ** < k, then the left
column is relevant and losses will be minimized by also increas-
ing k to k*. Thus irrespective of whether one expects rivals to
follow, it always seems best to increase k above any initial level


















FIGURE 2. Payoff matrix for changes in level of effort for Firm ;.
The prisoner's dilemma paradox is that such seemingly rational
individual behavior leads to a collective outcome where every-
one is worse off.
To summarize this section, the model presented here captures
two essential types of interactive behavior present in most reg-
ulated fisheries. The reaction of the regulatory authority to the
prevailing level of potential aggregate effort is incorporated and
assumed perfect in the sense that 6 is adjusted instantly and
accurately to ensure the targeted harvest level is not exceeded.
Individual decision makers in the industry are assumed to make
decisions regarding how much effort to employ by taking account
of behavior of other rival fishermen as well as that of the reg-
ulatory agency. Their collective decisions result in a common
property equilibrium that dissipates potential rents to a greater
or lesser degree depending upon how large A^ is.
The approach taken here differs from the traditional literature
in fishery economics in that the stock level is not a result of open378 James E. Wilen
access entry but is determined exogenously. In addition, the ex-
tent of rent dissipation depends upon the number of participants
in the industry and the nature of strategic rivalrous behavior
among them. In fisheries with few participants, this recognition
of their mutual interdependence leads to a relatively larger rent
equilibrium. As N gets large the situation approaches a more
traditional pure competition, full-dissipation equilibrium. The
model thus raises a new question—what determines whether A'
is large or small in various fisheries?
One simple way to look at this issue is to note that N defines
the number of fishing "firms" in a fleet. A fishing firm requires
an entrepreneur, of course, and also incurs set-up costs to enter
an industry. In fishing, these set-up costs may be substantial;
for example, a person must spend time and forgo income learning
about the waters, the habits of the fish, the gear, the weather,
and so on in order to even begin catching fish. Let us denote
the annualized value of such fixed costs FC to be C (= pFC
where p is the interest rate). Suppose also that the potential en-
trepreneur in question can earn n per year outside of the fishing
industry. Then, for an industry already composed of A' vessels,
it will pay our representative potential entrepreneur to become
a participant fisherman (create a new fishing "firm") as long as
or as long as revenues less capital and set-up costs^xceed op-
portunity costs. An industry equilibrium of both I and A^ is
reached when
/ - rkN = — 7 = N{U + C) (10)
Let j(k, N) represent the function in the middle of Equation (10).
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(remembering that I is a function of N). Thus as N increases, J
falls, while the right-hand side increases, ensuring a finite-sized
industry equilibrium, N = N.^ The characteristics of this equi-
librium are obvious from Equation (10) and provide some inter-
esting testable hypotheses. For example, one result the model
suggests is that localized inshore fisheries (e.g., lobster) will tend
to attract participants who are primarily local. For these indi-
viduals, the start-up costs will be lower than for outsiders be-
cause of specialized local knowledge (perhaps passed down
through generations) of the species' behavior, weather, seas, and
the like. If other local employment opportunities are limited the
effect is reinforced and further rent dissipation would be ex-
pected. High seas fisheries, in contrast (e.g., halibut), would tend
to be less localized, other things being equal, because we would
expect high start-up costs and few insider advantages. One might
also expect that technological developments such as electronic
sounders or fish finders would act to reduce localized advantage
and hence the fleet would become more mobile and less local—
or perhaps two fleets could exist simultaneously. In any case,
the model retains the flavor of traditional rent dissipation ideas
and yet allows the possibility of more efficient fisheries in which
one can say that, in an important sense, the existence of signif-
icant rents is a return to specialized skills that provide an entry
barrier in an otherwise open access industry.
Regulation by Incentive Mechanisms
It is likeiy that economists and biologists would judge the success
of a direct control regulatory scheme such as that modeled in
the preceding section by substantially different criteria. Biolo-
gists might point to the relative ease of administration and the
acceptability to fishermen of effort dampening types of regula-
tions as strong points. Their principal measure of success would
probably be how close the actual regulations came to targeted
harvest rates. Recommendations for improvements in the reg-
ulatory design would thus be directed towards better methods
of stock and fishing capacity measurement as well as better meth-
ods of on-line fine tuning.'* Economists, on the other hand, wouldJames E. Wilen
look al economic efficiency—the cost of harvesting the specific
targeted harvest rate—and would largely judge this scheme a
failure on those grounds.
From the standpoint of efficiency, the problem with potential-
effort dampening regulations is that they are ineffective instru-
ments with which to tackle failures of the incentive system. In
this case, although the species is protected, fishermen are led to
compete with each other for larger shares of the (fixed) allowable
catch. Thus there is a tendency to overinvest in potential fishing
capacity to either achieve an edge over one's rivals or to keep
up with one's rivals. Overall, of course, everyone faces the same
incentives, and when aggregate catch is fixed, such investments
simply dissipate rents and cause further tightening of regulations,
which negate the new capacity. Thus from an economist's point
of view, a more fruitful way to design regulatory schemes would
be to somehow impose the proper incentive schemes on indi-
vidual decision makers to cause them to behave as if they were
cost minimizers. Several schemes have been proposed and will
be examined below. i
Potential'Effort License
One scheme that has been particularly discussed by economists
is a licensing scheme whereby participants must purchase li-
censes to apply given amounts of effort. Serious practical prob-
lems exist in real-world cases, however, because potential effort
is difficult to measure and hence to tax. For our simplified model,
where potential effort is measured by k, it is easy to see how
such a scheme should work ideally. Let p represent the price of
a license to apply a unit of k. Then each fisherman will try to
maximize the modified profit function
A Nash equilibrium is reached when
^ ^ ^ NTowards a Theory of the Regulated Fishery 381
which defines the number of licenses that the industry will de-
mand at price p per unit effort. Suppose that regulatory author-
ities allocate an aggregate total of Nk licenses to the industry.
Since the license market must equilibrate, p will adjust until the
demand specified in Equation (13) equals the allotted supply or
until p = p'\ where:
and where Nk is the (fixed) allotted supply. Let M be the open
access equilibrium _Ievei of aggregate industry potential effort.
Suppose that Nk < Nk licenses are allotted or a buy-back scheme
is used to reduce the supply previously allotted. From Equation
14 above, it is obvious that with Nk licenses allotted, the market
clearing price depends on how large A' is. But N is determined
by profitability in the fishing industry relative to outside oppor-
tunities. With a licensing scheme, industry profits would be
/- Nk{r + p) = Nk ~—^ (r + p)
Nk Nk A^ - 1 / _/
N ~ X""" N - \ N Nk~ '' ~ N
and hence the equilibrium number of participants would adjust
to satisfy
c) N= y^j^ = yv (16)
which is the same number as in the regulated open access case
in Equation (10). Thus an allotment reduction becomes absorbed
wholly through reductions in potential effort per vessel k rather
than numbers of participants. As the allotment approaches the
efficient effort level N/i, the price of licenses rises top''. At less
restrictive allotments it will be necessary to adjust 6 to keep
fi^NK) = H. In fact, the equilibrium license price can be ex-382 James E. Wilen
pressed as a function of either the ratio of efficient to allotted
aggregate effort or the ratio of unregulated equilibrium effort to
allotted effort:
I which varies inversely with the allo^ent Nk between p'' (for Nk
= /VA and e = I) and zero (when M = Nk and 9 - k/k). This
expression also allows us a convenient form for aggregate in-
dustry rents that would accrue to the grantor (e.g., the govern-
ment if an auction is held) or the original holders (if licenses were
allotted free and reduced by buy-back or attrition), namely
Jk _
p'-Nk ^ rNk^-7 - \ = riNk - Nk) (18)
Nk
where A^A: > Nk. Thus an effort-directed licensing scheme will
not improve the welfare of individual fishermen over the unli-
censed situation. Profits accruing to each fisherman-entrepre-
neur will be the same regardless of how many licenses are al-
lotted, since license prices rise to absorb rents as they accrue
as Nk is reduced.
Participation License
[Another qualitatively different method for potential effort re-
duction is to license the entrepreneur or fisherman-owner rather
than aggregate vessel capacity. Alaska has done this in its salmon
limitation program and in British Columbia the herring fishery
is regulated similarly. From the point of view of the individual
fisherman, a fixed cost associated with staying in the industry
should have no impact on the marginal capacity decision as de-
termined by Equation (8), given that N is fixed. However, since
A: is a function of N and since by Equation (10) a lower N willTowards a Theory of the Regulated Fishery 383
increase equilibrium profits per vessel, pressure to enter the in-
dustry will drive the price_of participation license^ up to a pos-
itive level whenever A^ < A^ where A' satisfies rk(N)/{l^ - I) =
n + C in Equation (10). In fact, with sufficient competition, the
market clearing price of A' licenses to participate will eliminate
any above-normal advantage to being in the industry, that is:
- (U + C) (19)
a function of N bounded from below by 0 (when N = TV) and
above by p/v (when N =^ N, the efficient number of participants).
With this price, each participant's profits will be
J - ri - p« = ^ - rt (l + ^) + n + C
= ^"'*Ar^ + " + ^ *2"'
for any chosen k and a given number N ^ N of licenses. But for
a given A', by Equation (8) above, the optimally chosen k is such
that the first two terms on the right-hand side sum to zero and
hence profits are n + C, which is independent of A: and A^. These
profits, moreover, are by Equation (10) the (regulated) open ac-
cess profit level; hence a participation licensing scheme will (like
an effort license scheme) leave fishermen's incomes absolutely
unchanged. Prices will simply rise to confer rents on original
holders or the grantor depending upon how such licenses are
transferred. Overall, there will be fewer participants, each em-
ploying vessels that have more potential fishing capacity than
without participation licenses.
Effort Tax
Another often-proposed mechanism is a tax on a vessel's po-
tential capacity or effort potential. This scheme would work ex-
actly like the aggregate effort license scheme, except that au-384 James E. Wilen
thorities would have to calculate a tax rate instead of an allotment
of licenses. This can be seen by noting that an effort tax on the
vessel affects profits in the same way as a license price, and
hence the Nash equilibrium for a vessel tax t,. is
^ , N
as in Equation 13 above. The optimal (efficiency-producing) tax
rate is defined by
: A^ - 1 /
Simply by increasing /, to r,,, authorities may force vessel owners
to employ the efficient amount of capital. At rates below t]., the
tax policy must also be supplemented with an effort-dampening
policy in order to maintain the selected harvest rate. It also is
true that in this case the number of participants will equilibrate
at the level shown in Equation (16) and profits will be //N^ re-
gardless of what the tax rate is, as in previous examples.
Fish Tax
A landing tax r^^that leaves fishermen with a net value of 1 ~ tf
per fish, alters the fishermen's perceived profits shown in Equa-
tion (3) by multiplying / by 1 - tf. Thus the new Nash equilib-
rium is where
N r
(23) Nk* N - \ \ ~ tf
Hence a landing tax works exactly like a vessel tax or license
charge increase, since when ly rises, r/(l - tf) also rises. The





FIGURE 3. Direct regulation and tax policy options in a regulated fishery.
Again, setting tf< iywill require additional effort control, which
can be achieved by using 6.
Combined Policies
From the above, it should be apparent that in this simple model
any of the above instruments can be employed to achieve effi-
ciency alone or in concert with any of the others. It may be
administratively more desirable, for example, to have moderate
taxes on both the vessel and the landings than one heavy tax on
either alone. Or it may be desirable to sacrifice some efficiency
by setting 6 < I and then using some lower combination of taxes
to achieve a second-best efficiency level. The diagram in Figure
3 delineates, as an example, the combination of policy param-386 James E. Wilen
eters that might be used and their impacts, if one were interested
in combining effort and landing taxes and direct effort restric-
tions.
The darkened line in Figure 3 is the efficiency locus of landing
and vessel taxes that will force fishermen to employ cost-min-
imizing levels of k. Tax combinations inside of the locus must
be supported with additional effort-restricting policies in order
to reach the desired harvest target levels. The equation 6 =
{\/a)[{r + tMl ~ //•)] defines the level ofe necessary, in general,
for any combination of tax rates (r,, tj). For combinations of tax
rates not on the locus, of course, efjficiency losses must be in-
curred, since 9 < 1 implies extra (and wasted) capacity. The
losses may be calculated as
rN [k - {km = rN (k - ka ^-^^\ (25)
where tf^\- ria and t^ ^ a - r.
Summary
The model of a regulated fishery introduced above is a first ap-
proximation of a theory in which fishing industry behavior is
aggregated from a microeconomic-levei theory of the individual
unit's behavior. Particular attention has been paid to incorpo-
rating several important features of real-world regulated fish-
eries. At the macroeconomic level, it has been assumed that
regulatory agencies target aggregate harvest levels and employ
nonselective measures to control aggregate effort such as short-
ened seasons, area closures, and the like in order to meet the
targets. At the microeconomic level it has been assumed that
individual units take regulatory agency behavior as given (and
completely effective) and make investment decisions based on
expectations of fellow fishermen's decisions. Thus the equilib-
rium concept is one of a Nash equilibrium for an A^-person non-
cooperative game. The characteristics of the equilibrium are
slightly different from traditional fishery literature, since some
positive rents can be earned in equilibrium, although the amount
is small for fisheries with many participants.Towards a Theory of the Regulated Fishery 387
In the section on incentive mechanisms we examine the impact
on such a regulated industry of additional controls designed to
improve economic efficiency. Two quantitative controls—ag-
gregate effort licensing and participation licensing—and two
pricing controls—effort taxes and landing taxes—are examined.
Results in this simple one-input case are all similar; namely, the
fishermen's welfare remains unaltered but efficiency is improved
as controls are made more stringent. In all but one scheme the
impact is to leave participation unchanged and affect the amount
of investment of potential effort per participant. Some results
showing how efficiency and traditional effort-control policy para-
meters may be combined to achieve different levels of efficiency
are also derived.
There are several extensions of this simple model that are
being developed to present in future papers. The most important
is an extension from a single- to a multiple-input effort produc-
tion technology. In real multiple-input fisheries, traditional con-
trols have potentially complex impacts on choice of fishing tech-
nology and on actual fishing behavior, a point that becomes
obvious when we contrast, for example, how a reduction in sea-
son length would be responded to by fishermen compared with
a gear restriction. The second extension is an examination of
disequilibrium mechanisms. It is important for policy purposes.
for example, whether the participation rate responds faster than
the per-firm effort potential or vice versa when price goes up.
Whichever is true will determine what types of policy instru-
ments are most appropriate and the specific mechanism will dic-
tate at what levels policy parameters should be set. Finally, the
model needs to be amended to account for uncertainty and the
inability of regulatory agencies (and/or the regulatees) to forecast
and measure perfectly and respond instantly. All of these factors
are important in varying degrees in real fisheries and hence
should be examined for a better understanding of regulated fish-
eries.
Notes
1. Since H = f{QNk) defines 6, we have d = [f-H'R)yNk. But 6
= 1 at // = fiNk), so that Nk = f-\H). Thus 6 = kik defines the
optimal regulatory function graphed in Figure 1.James E. Wilen
2. As N is small, on the other hand, the gap between efficient inputs
and those chosen by Nash competitors narrows with the possibility
that for N sufficiently small, the efficient input level would be chosen.
_3. In this case, per vessel profits at the equilibrium values of A and
N turn out to be f/N- = n + C, implying N = VUKU + C)]. Thus
the open-access number of firms can be considered fixed and deter-
mined exogenously if the response of numbers of participants is rapid.
A more complete approach would include some dynamics of adjust-
ment of participants and of effort response of participants.
4. Such as disaggregating overall quotas into gear-type quotas to
permit easier control of a fleet consisting of vessels of differing effec-
tiveness.